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FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY LAWS OF 1947
J. M. FLOWERS*
The important statutory changes in Florida real prop-
erty law effected during the 1947 session of the Legisla-
ture are found in three fields: conveyances by husband
and wife; actions to quiet title to land; and public high-
ways. The requirement that a married woman must ac-
knowledge separately a contract to convey real estate has
been adandoned. A new action for quieting title to land,
which if generally accepted may offer all the advantages
of a registry system, has been introduced. The author
views with alarm a statute ripening the public easement
in state highways and county roads into a fee simple.
These acts and others which the lawyer may encounter
in his everyday practice, will be discussed in this article.
A married woman need no longer acknowledge a con-
tract to convey her separate real estate or to relinquish
dower in her husband's.' The legislature has amended an
act,2 which first appeared in 1892, providing that such a
contract could not be enforced in equity unless it was not
only acknowledged, but also acknowledged out of the pres-
ence of the husband. Apparently this provision was de-
signed to enforce the policy declared in an earlier statute'
which required a married woman's deed, effective to con-
vey separate property or t6 relinquish dower in her hus-
band's, to be separately acknowledged. It was doubtless
feared that this statute could be circumvented by a suit
for specific performance based on an informal written
agreement. In 1943, the Legislature dispensed 4 with the
requirement that deeds and contracts to sell be acknowl-
edged separately, and it was thought by many that the
"Member of the Florida and Alabama Bars; B.S., Vanderbilt Uni-
versity, 1915; LL.B. University of Alabama, 1917.
1 Ch. 23S20. 1947, effective May 27, 1947; F.S.A. §693.03.
2 §2076, R. S. 1892; F. S. 1911, §708.07.
; 1, Act of Feb. 4, 1935; ch. 3011, 1877; F. S. 1941, §693.03.
4 Ch. 21746, 1943; F. S. A. §693.03.
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prohibition on decrees for specific performance had also
been removed by necessary implication; but the Supreme
Court of Florida ruled otherwise. 5 The Legislature has
now made its intent clear.
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the effect of the
amended statute was to oust equity of a jurisdiction
otherwise assumed to exist; therefore, a contract execu-
ted after the effective date of the 1943 statute, but before
May 27, 1947, the effective date of the amendment, may
now be enforced. The present wording of the act may in-
vite the contention that the amendment has repealed the
requirement found in the 1943 statute that a husband
join in a wife's conveyance of her separate property; but
inasmuch as the wording of the statute remains un-
changed in this respect, and in view of the history of the
amendment, it is submitted that this contention should
not prevail.
A husband or wife owning separate real property in
fee simple may now create a tenancy by the entirety by
conveying one to the other, reciting in the deed the pur-
pose to create such an estate. ' Heretofore husband and
wife have been authorized7 to convey to one another, but
strictly interpreted, this statute does not include a con-
veyance by one to both. The act has, however, been liber-
ally construed, and now the Legislature has incorporated
into the statute the rule (f the cases. It is unfortunate
that the Legislature did not provide for the destruction
of estates by the entirety, or specify that the grantee
need not join in the conveyance."
What is perhaps the most significant development of
the 1947 session is the introduction"' of a new procedure
for quieting title to land, designated as the "cumulative
Berlin v. Jacobs . ..... Fla ........ 24 So. (2d) 717 (1946). This case and
the statutes preceding it are the subject of a comment in 1 Miami L. Q.
37 (1947),
6 Ch. 23964, 1947, effective June 16, 1947; F. S. A. §689.11.
7 Ch. 5147, 1903; F. S. 1941, §689.11.
- Johnson v. Landerfield, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939).
I The grantee did join in the conveyance in Johnson v. Landerfield,
sipra note S.
Io Ch. 2 099, .19,17, effective JIiin 16, 19-17; F. S. A. §89,)1-20.
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method".1' The new procedure differs from the previous
ones, which continue to be available, in that a proceeding
in rem is now authorized, the former methods being en-
tirely in personam. -1 2 Under the cumulative method, the
plaintiff may proceed against the property, serving actual
or constructive notice upon all persons believed to have
an adverse interest therein, or he may at his option pro-
ceed directly against the adverse claimants.
An action may be brought by any person claiming an
estate of freehold or by any person who has conveyed
property by warranty deed, whether in possession of the
property or not. The plaintiff's claim may be based upon
record title deraigned from an appropriate sovereignty,
upon a tax deed or foreclosure, upon adverse possession,
with or without color of title, or upon public records
which have been lost, stolen or destroyed. When the pro-
ceeding is to be in rem, it is brought in the circuit court
of the county in which all or part of the land lies, against
"all persons claiming any estate, right, title or interest
in, or lien upon" the specific property. A sworn statement
must be filed with the bill of complaint setting out the
nature of the plaintiff's claim. All persons having an ad-
verse claim and their addresses must be included in the
statement. Where this information is not available, the
reason therefore must be stated fully and explicitly. Serv-
ice of process is begun by publishing a summons in which
the property is described. Copies of this summons, with
a memorandum attached showing the names of any ad-
verse claimants disclosed in the bill of complaint or sworn
statement, are then posted in a conspicuous place on each
it "Cumulative" because in addition to F. S. 1941, §§66.11-.15, based
on ch. 4739, 1899, and F. S. 1941, §§66.16-.24, ch. 11385, 1925. The lat-
ter is designated as the "additional remedy".
12 The "additional remedy" was characterized as "quasi-in-rem".
"A suit under chapter 11383 will lie against known defendants to quiet
against a cloud of a known or an unknown nature; and against un-
known defendants to quiet against a cloud of a known nature; but a
bill seeking only to quiet a cloud, the nature and existence of which
is wholly unknown, as against defendants, who are also wholly un-
known, does not present a justiciable matter under this statute in its
present form. McDaniel v. MeElvey, 91 Fla. 770. 108 So. 820 11926);
Greene v. Uniacke, 46 F. (2) 916 (1931).
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parcel of land. Copies of the summons and memorandum
must be served personally on each adverse claimant found
within the state. If a known claimant cannot be served
within the state, copies are addressed to him by first class
mail, prepaid. Where personal service cannot be made
upon a resident, or where the address is not known, copies
of the summons and memorandum must be mailed to him
at the county seat of each county in which the land lies.
The court is given jurisdiction to appoint a guardian ad
litem to represent minors, persons of unsound mind, or
convicts; but this need not be done unless it affirmatively
appears that such persons are interested. It is also pos-
sible to join all parcels of real property belonging to the
plaintiff which are situated in the same county.
Such sweeping provisions will doubtless invite chal-
lenge on the part of some person having an adverse claim
to the land, who is not named in the bill of complaint or
statement, and was at all times a resident of the state,
or who, although named, has not been served personally
within the state, claiming that he has been deprived of
property without due process of law. A cautious lawyer,
not wishing to assume this risk, will prefer to follow the
established methods when adverse claimants are known
and a particular cloud is to be removed. It may be pointed
out, however, that if this procedure can successfully with-
stand attack, the groundwork has been laid for a prac-
tical registry device, offering many of the advantages
of the Torrens System. Every attorney engaged to pass
on title for a purchaser can, by means of the cumulative
method, insure a title which after seven years possession
will be impregnable, and in the meantime may with cau-
tion be made virtually as secure.
It is the opinion of the writer that this act will with-
stand attack on the ground that it expropriates property
without due process of law. Cases 3 arising under the state
and federal constitutions have repeatedly affirmed the
proposition that a state, having inherent authority over
the titles of lands within its territory, cannot be deprived
13 American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 31 S. Ct. 200, 55 L. Ed.
491 (1910), cited and followed in McDaniel v. MeElvey, 91 Fla. 770, 108
So. 820 (1926) and Tibbets v. Olson, 91 FlI. 824, 108 So. 679 (1926).
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of jurisdiction to determine rights and interests claimed
therein by the absence from its borders of adverse claim-
ants. Due process requires, however, that some effort be
made fairly calculated to apprise such absentees of the
pending action.'" The fact that a non-resident has had
actual notice of suit does not bar him from asserting that
the statutory method is invalid because it does not com-
ply with the requirements of due process.' 5 While service
of notice by registered mail may be necessary where an
action is only quasi in rem,'" the requirements of due pro-
cess are served in actions strictly in rem by actual per-
sonal service upon known resident claimants and service
by publication in the case of unknown claimants and per-
sons beyond the territorial limits of the state. This rule
has been exemplified in land registry proceedings, '1 ac-
tions to quiet title to land,'5 and proceedings for the set-
tlement of the estates of decedents.'" Where land is in-
volved, a nonresident owner is held20 to owe a duty to be
represented when his land is requisitioned by, or is other-
wise subjected to the processes of, the state.
It may be noted that this statute goes beyond the re-
quirements of due process in requiring the mailing of
notices where persons cannot actually be served. Con-
structive service upon unknown claimants and persons
whose addresses cannot be ascertained, if actually resi-
dent within the state, is authorized only if by diligent
inquiry they cannot be found. Since the findings of fact
by a court in support of its own jurisdiction are always
I+ See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091
(1927).
is Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259, 72 L. Ed. 446
(1928).
16 The "additional remedy" was quasi-in-rem. See note 12, supra.
17 American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 31 S. Ct. 200, 55 L. Ed.
491 (1910).
IN Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 10 S. Ct. 557, 33 L. Ed. 918 (1890);
Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U. S. 261, 32 S. Ct. 303, 56 L. Ed. 429 (1912).
19 Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 16 S. Ct. 585, 40 L. Ed. 491
(1896); Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U. S. 458, 25 S Ct. 721,
49 L. Ed. 1125 (1905).
20 Huling V. Kaw Valley R. Co., 130 U. S. 559, 9 S. Ct. 603, 32 L. Ed.
1045 (1889), cited and followed in McDaniel v. McElvey, 91 Fla. 770,
108 So. 820 (1926).
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subject to collateral attack,21 the question whether due
diligence was in fact exercised will not be foreclosed by
the proceeding in question, at least not until seven years
have elapsed. To ameliorate this disadvantage, the statute
provides that no subsequent action shall be tried until all
parties to the first have been served or accounted or.
The danger of collateral attack can be minimized. .ow-
ever, if lawyers having recourse to the cumulative method
will insist upon a careful examination of the title.
There is a possible defect in the statute in that it does
not require trial by jury when an issue of ejectment is
framed.-2 2 Other features of the act relating to procedure,
including the powerof the court to dispense with a guard-
ian ad litem unless it affirmatively appears that disabil-
ity exists, are similar to features of the older statutes,
and have received judicial approval.23
The "additional remedy"2 4 to quiet title to land has also
been amended 2 to specify that in deraigning title, the
plaintiff must show the original source of his title or trace
it back for a period of at least seven years, unless the
court directs otherwise. The "additional remedy", intro-
duced in 1925, combined in one action the former bill quia
timet in equity and the legal action of ejectment, pro-
viding for trial of the issue of ejectment before a jury.26
The act required that the complainant deraign his title,
but did not specify the manner of doing this. If this re-
quirement were strictly construed, it would deny use of
the additional remedy to a person claiming by right of
adverse possession without color of title, who could not
deraign title to its ultimate source in a sovereign state;
but the statute was more liberally construed by the Su-
preme Court of Florida. 7
21 See Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. Ed. 897 (1874).
22 See Hawkins v. Rellim Inv. Co., 92 Fla. 784, 110 So. 350 (1926);
Briles v. Bradford, 54 Fla. 501, 44 So. 937 (1907).
23 McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926); Tibbetts v.
Olson, 91 Fla. 824, 108 So. 679 (1926).
24 §§1-9, Ch. 11383, 1925; F. S. 1941, §§66.16-.24.
25 Ch. 24293, 1947, effective June 16, 1947.
2 Hawkins v. Rellim Inv. Co. 92 Fla. 784, 110 So. 350 (1926); Saw-
yer v. Gustason, 96 Fla. 6, 118 So. 57 (1928).
27 McDanicl v. M('Elvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926).
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The amendment therefore seems to have been designed
to incorporate in the statute a rule which formerly could
be found only in the cases., Because the language of the
amendment is less explicit than that of the court, it ap-
pears to raise new problems. From time immemorial, it
was required in actions of ejectment that title be deraign-
ed from sovereignty or from a party in possession. The
reason for this latter alternative is, that the party shown
to be in possession is presumed by law to have title, and
a prima facie case is thus established. It was also the rule
in ejectment actions that the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his own title, not the weakness of the defen-
dant's. Inasmuch as the "additional remedy" allows the
bringing of an action where defendant is in possession, the
amendment might be construed as barring a plaintiff who
cannot deraign title to a person in possession within seven
years, even where the defendant's has been of shorter
duration, or it might be construed as permitting the plain-
tiff to show only the weakness of the defendant's title,
not the strength of his own. If the purpose of the amend-
ment as stated above is kept in mind, the court will obvi-
ate these difficulties by permitting or requiring the plain-
tiff in such cases to deraign his title to someone in pos-
session.
An amendment 2 to two sections 29 of the Florida Stat-
utes which relate to the acquisition of title to public
roads by adverse user, increases the title of the State
Road Department and the several counties to one in fee
simple. It has heretofore been the accepted view in this
state that when private property is taken for a public
road by eminent domain proceedings, the title acquired
is a mere easement 0 Presumably this would also be true
of title acquired by adverse user. If the state or county
acquires a fee simple title, the owner would have no right
to recover the property when the road is abandoned or
28 Ch. 23935, effective June 6, 1944; F. S. A. §§341.59, 341.66.
29 F. S. 1941, §§341.59, 341.66.
30 Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Southern Inv. Co. 53 Fla. 832, 44
So. 351 (1907); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Kickliter, -Fla.--, 32
So. (2d) 166 adv. (1947); Jacksonville T. K. W Ry. Co. v. Uckwood,
33 Fla. 573, 15 So. 327 (1894). An abutting owner is presumed to own
title to center of road or street.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
relocated. This act therefore threatens potentially sweep-
ing effects, and as such, presents some difficult constitu-
tional problems.
The Constitution of Florida provides certain require-
ments for the protection of the individual where property
is taken in exercise of the right of eminent domain. There
must be a judicial review of the question whether or not
the property is required for a public purpose," and there
must be a judicial determination of the question of
value. The purchase price must further be secured be-
fore the property can be occupied.3 A statute which ex
proprie vigore simply expropriates private property would
violate all of these requirements. The former sections
which have been amended herein, have accordingly been
held"4 to be in the nature of a statute of limitations upon
an action for wrongful taking, or an act to quiet title to
land already acquired where there are defects in the pro-
ceedings or in the record of title.
Will the act be construed as ripening all present ease-
ments, whether acquired by eminent domain proceedings
or by adverse possession, into a fee with the passage of
four years? Possession under an actual or presumed grant
cannot of itself ripen into a fee, because it would in no
way be adverse to the interests of the owner. The lan-
guage of the act, which is carried over from the earlier
statute, specifically excludes from the operation of the
act roads the title to which has already been acquired by
adverse user; but it is silent as to land acquired by dedi-
cation, grant, or eminent domain.
If it is construed as applying only to roads which have
not yet been maintained for four years, exclusive of those
acquired by eminent domain, the act presents fewer con-
stitutional problems, but more practical ones. Statutes
providing for the acquisition of a fee instead of an ease-
ment when exercising the power of eminent domain, have
31 Sibley v. volusia County, 147 Fla. 302, 2 So. 2d 578 (1941).
32 Spafford v. Brevard County, 92 Fla. 617, 110 So. 451 (1926).
33 ibid.
3 Bridgehead Land Co. v. Hale, 145 Fla. 389, 199 So. 361 (1941);
Palm Beach County v. Florida Cons. Dist., 126 Fla. 170. 170 S). 630
(1936),
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generally been held" constitutional. It must now be deter-
mined as a practical matter whether a road, the title to
which is in question, was acquired before or after June
6, 1943, to determine whether the State Road Department
or a county has a fee or a mere easement.
A statute36 providing for the closing of public roads by
counties, apparently new in its entirety, provides that if
title is held in fee, the county shall on abandonment con-
vey title to the abutting owners. If the Legislature did
not wish to vest the incidents of a fee in the counties,
why did it make this change?
New statutes of limitation have been provided for ac-
tions to enforce tax titles. 7 Heretofore the statutes" re-
quired four years' actual possession under a tax deed
before a suit was barred, and also that where the property
was in the possession of another, the holder of a tax deed
must sue for possession within four years. In 1943, the
Legislature amended 9 the law to protect Murphy titles,
that is, titles which had passed to the state of Florida be-
cause of nonpayment of taxes, by requiring that suits to.
question Murphy titles must be brought within six
months. The new act now provides that where a tax deed
of any kind is issued for property, the former owner of
the land shalt have only one year after the deed is placed
of record to sue for the possession of the land, if the holder
of the tax deed is in possession, or to attack the tax deed
in any manner. The new act also requires the holders of
a tax deed to bring suit for possession within three years
after the date of the tax deed. As the law now stands,
where property is vacant when a tax deed is recorded,
the former owner is barred unless he brings suit to set
aside the deed within one year; but if the land is in pos-
session of the former owner, the holder of the tax deed
is barred unless he sues for possession within three years.
35 See Fairchild v. City of St. Paul, 46 Minn. 540, 49 N. W. 325
(1891); Rottschaeffer, Constitutional Law (1939), 709; 25 Am. Jur.
§134.
3.6 Ch. 23963, 1947; effective June 16, 1947; F. S. A. §343.42.
37 Ch. 23827, 1947, effective May 27, 1947; F. S. A. §192.48.
3s F. S. 1941, §196.06.
'9 Ch. 21685, 1943; F. S. A. §192.48.
1947]
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The statute is prospective in operation, and is unques-
tionably constitutional.
Cancellation of tax certificates twenty years old is
authorized and directed by Chapter 23828"0 of the 1947
Laws. Heretofore such tax certificates were invalid, but
it was impossible to remove them from the record without
suit. The new section obviates the necessity of suit; but
does not apply to certificates held by public bodies.
Chapter 23832' authorizes and directs the clerk of
the Circuit Court to cancel all tax certificates issued prior
to 1940 on land the title to which has passed to the state
under the Murphy Law. Certificates held by public bodies
are not affected. Prior to the passage of this act, these
certificates were invalid, but could not be cancelled with-
out suit.
Chapter 2420542 authorized the County Commissioners
of any county to disclaim any interest for the public in
any street or road, with the exception of federal and state
highways and streets within municipal limits. The closing
of streets and roads heretofore made is also validated.
Chapter 243034 authorizes county commissioners to
vacate and annul plats on application of the sub-divider
or of owners under subsequent plats. It was commonly
approved in practice prior to 1947 for a subdivider to
place of record a new plat and secure the approval of the
county commissioners thereon. Lawyers have passed title
upon the theory that the county, by approving the new
plat, has barred the rights of the public in the easement
created by the old. The problem of getting a deed out
of the county has never arisen because the title to the
street is vested in the adjoining owners, and the interest
of the public has been treated as a mere easement. The
easement is relinquished by approval of the new plat.
The new act which purports to ripen easements into a
fee, which is discussed above, may increase the difficul-
ties which the section under consideration has sought to
avoid.
40 May 27, 1947; F: S. A. §196.12-1 et seq.
41 F. S. A. §192.50-1.
42 Effective June 16, 19417: F. S. A. 3,13.45-.19.
43 Effective June 16, 1947: F. S. A. §177.14.
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Construction of statutes in advance of court decisions
is extremely hazardous, and the reader must take my
opinions for what they are worth. I do think, however,
that the 1947 session has given real property lawyers
something to think about.
